Coupled catastrophes: sudden shifts cascade and hop among interdependent
  systems by Brummitt, Charles D. et al.
Coupled catastrophes: sudden shifts cascade and hop among
interdependent systems
Charles D. Brummitt∗1,2,6, George Barnett3, and Raissa M. D’Souza2,4,5,7
1Department of Mathematics, 2Complexity Sciences Center, 3Department of
Communication, 4Department of Computer Science, 5Department of Mechanical
Engineering, University of California, Davis, CA 95616 USA, 6Center for the Management
of Systemic Risk, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027 USA, 7Santa Fe Institute,
Santa Fe, NM 87501 USA
October 1, 2018
Abstract
An important challenge in several disciplines is to understand how sudden changes can propagate among
coupled systems. Examples include the synchronization of business cycles, population collapse in patchy
ecosystems, markets shifting to a new technology platform, collapses in prices and in confidence in financial
markets, and protests erupting in multiple countries. A number of mathematical models of these phenomena
have multiple equilibria separated by saddle-node bifurcations. We study this behavior in its normal
form as fast–slow ordinary differential equations. In our model, a system consists of multiple subsystems,
such as countries in the global economy or patches of an ecosystem. Each subsystem is described by
a scalar quantity, such as economic output or population, that undergoes sudden changes via saddle-
node bifurcations. The subsystems are coupled via their scalar quantity (e.g., trade couples economic
output; diffusion couples populations); that coupling moves the locations of their bifurcations. The model
demonstrates two ways in which sudden changes can propagate: they can cascade (one causing the next),
or they can hop over subsystems. The latter is absent from classic models of cascades. For an application,
we study the Arab Spring protests. After connecting the model to sociological theories that have bistability,
we use socioeconomic data to estimate relative proximities to tipping points and Facebook data to estimate
couplings among countries. We find that although protests tend to spread locally, they also seem to “hop”
over countries, like in the stylized model; this result highlights a new class of temporal motifs in longitudinal
network datasets.
Keywords: tipping point; regime shift; fold catastrophe; coupled systems; cascades; the Arab Spring
1 Introduction
Sudden changes propagating among coupled systems
poses a significant scientific challenge in many dis-
ciplines, yet we lack an adequate mathematical un-
derstanding of how local sudden changes spread [9].
Earth’s biosphere, for example, appears to be ap-
proaching several planetary-scale sudden changes
triggered by human activity, including species extinc-
tion, desertification, and lake eutrophication, that
spread from one spatial patch to another [9]. That
∗Corresponding author: c.brummitt@columbia.edu
spatial spread poses dangers but also opportunities
for detecting early warning signs [101, 27, 28]. So-
cioeconomic systems have examples, too: Booms and
busts in business cycles in different economies appear
to be synchronizing because of trade, financial, and
other linkages [15, 83, 53, 20]. Poverty traps at multi-
ple scales seem to be coupled [10]. Abrupt declines in
an asset price can trigger sharp declines in confidence
and fire sales of other assets, as occurred in the 2007–
2008 global financial crisis [76]. Protests and social
uprisings appear to spread contagiously among coun-
tries, with one protest seeming to inspire others via
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news and social media [49, 52]. The equilibrium sup-
ply and demand of a new technology that replaces
an old one (such as compact discs replacing cas-
settes or electric cars replacing fuel cars) can change
abruptly [59], and movement of people between dis-
tinct markets can facilitate adoption of the new tech-
nology [23]. In each of these examples, a system con-
sists of distinct subsystems that (1) change suddenly
between equilibria and (2) are coupled. A mathemat-
ical understanding of these phenomena could pave
the way to predicting and to steering these sudden
changes.
In this paper, we take a step toward the goal of
mathematically understanding how sudden changes
can spread among coupled systems [9]. Our model
consists of one system, such as the global economy or
a large ecosystem, that consists of multiple subsys-
tems coupled to one another; for example, economies
of multiple countries are coupled by trade, while
patches of an ecosystem are coupled by movement of
organisms. To choose dynamics, we note that many
models of the aforementioned phenomena (cited in
the second column of Table 1) have one or three equi-
libria and an S-shaped bifurcation diagram (which is
equivalent to a slice of the cusp catastrophe [95]).
Thus, we let each subsystem evolve according to
the normal form of this catastrophe. The state of
each subsystem can change suddenly when it passes
a saddle-node bifurcation, one of the simplest types
of “regime shifts” (which are sudden changes in a sys-
tem’s state) [14]. Next, we introduce linear couplings
between these subsystems, meaning that a change in
one subsystem affects other subsystems coupled to it
in proportion to that change. These couplings move
the locations of the latter subsystems’ bifurcations.
This model allows us to explore how regime shifts
can synchronize and spread. Suppose one subsystem
X “drives” (i.e., affects) another subsystem Y , which
we denote by X ⇀ Y . Then a regime shift in X
can trigger one in Y , meaning that their regime shifts
synchronize. If the driven subsystem Y drives a third
subsystem Z (i.e., if X ⇀ Y ⇀ Z), then one possible
behavior is a cascade of regime shifts, one triggering
another like falling dominoes. Another possibility is
that the “intermediate” subsystem Y is far from its
tipping point but that the others (X and Z) are close
to their tipping points; then a regime shift in the
driver subsystem X can nudge the intermediate sub-
system Y enough to push Z past its tipping point but
not so much that Y passes its tipping point. That is,
a sequence of regime shifts can “hop” over intermedi-
ate subsystems. This phenomenon is not observed in
classic models of cascades (e.g., percolation, epidemic
spreading, and sandpile models).
This “model of many models” abstracts from many
domain-specific details. It suggests what might hap-
pen in more realistic settings. To give an example,
we consider protests erupting nearly simultaneously
in many countries. We first show how two sociological
theories of revolutions give rise to the same S-shaped
bifurcation diagram used to model the individual sub-
systems of our mathematical model. We also indicate
how our model can generalize these sociological the-
ories to multiple, coupled countries in a stylized way.
Then we consider data on the Arab Spring, the revolts
and uprisings that seemingly cascaded among coun-
tries in the Middle East and Northern Africa starting
in December 2010 [52]. We explore whether protests
spread locally in two networks that capture possible
influence to protest, Facebook and shared borders,
but we also find evidence of protests seeming to hop
over countries.
Our approach differs from the many recent studies
of cascades in interdependent networks [37, 18, 87], all
of which model “interdependence” and “coupling” as
occurring between pairs of nodes (individual “agents”)
belonging to different subsystems. Instead, we con-
sider subsystems coupled via some aggregate quan-
tity, such as investment between sectors [71] or the
fraction of people protesting in a country [62].
Much attention is paid to regime shifts in large,
central nodes, such as recessions in central economies
or insolvency of large banks. Our findings suggest
that small changes in these central nodes (potentially
triggered by a large change in a small node adjacent
to it) can suffice to trigger a regime shift in a periph-
eral node close to its tipping point.
2 Normal-form model of cou-
pled subsystems with one or
two stable states
We begin by considering two subsystems X and Y ,
each described by a single real number, x(t) and y(t),
that changes over time t. (Interpretations of x(t), y(t)
for various contexts are given in the third column of
Table 1.) The subsystems evolve according to the
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Table 1: Examples of coupled subsystems in which each subsystem undergoes sudden changes in the form of
saddle-node bifurcations, in models cited in the column “regime shift”. The column “scalar quantity” describes
the state of the subsystem, and it corresponds to x(t), y(t), or z(t) in the model in Sec. 2. Citations in the
fourth column include empirical studies and mathematical models.
discipline regime shift scalar quantity examples of couplings among subsystems
ecology extinction due to over-
harvesting [82, 75]
population diffusion among patches of an ecosys-
tem [101, 28]
economics boom and bust in the
Kaldor model of busi-
ness cycles [102]
output (gross do-
mestic product)
investment between sectors [71], trade [59]
and capital flows [92] between countries can
synchronize business cycles
economics currency crisis (devalu-
ation or, for a peg, loss
of reserves) [73]
currency value changes in macroeconomic fundamentals,
sentiment, perceived riskiness, risk aver-
sion [73], trade [32]
economics poverty trap [6, 74] well-being (capital,
capabilities)
fractal poverty traps [10]
finance asset price declines [39,
19]
asset price asset-to-asset contagion (a bank with a de-
clining asset sells other assets) [51]
finance probability of bank
failure [47]
probability of bank
failure
worry about institutions’ creditworthiness
spreads contagiously [3]
technology
adoption
sudden change to new
platform [59, 45]
difference between
supply and demand
of the new platform
movement of people among distinct mar-
kets [23]
political uprisings, revolts [62,
93]
number of protest-
ors
communication spreads inspiration, success-
ful strategies across borders [38, 49, 52, 56];
raising importance of identity [93] that span
borders [48]
autonomous ordinary differential equations
dx
dt
= −x3 + cx+ a+ CX(y, x) (1a)
dy
dt
= −y3 + dy + b+ CY (x, y), (1b)
where C·(·, ·) are some coupling functions (specified
later), and where a, b, c, d ∈ R are parameters that
change slowly compared to x(t), y(t), so System (1)
is a fast–slow system [60].
Variants of System (1) have been studied in many
contexts, including the double cusp catastrophe [40,
106, 21], cuspoidal nets [2, 1], and coupled van der Pol
oscillators [97, 96, 86, 98, 84, 85, 22, 72] (for more
information, see Appendix B). Coordination games
and global games in economics are similar to Sys-
tem (1) in that they also permit multiple equilibria,
but they lack dynamics. Global games have been ap-
plied to currency crises [78], debt crises [79, 26], bank
runs [42, 89], and riots and political change [5, 31];
moreover, contagion has been studied in generaliza-
tions of these models, such as currency crises trigger-
ing more currency crises [73], bank crises triggering
more bank crises [42], and currency crises triggering
bank crises [41]. Here we take a catastrophe-theoretic
approach [95] and emphasize the role of multiple equi-
libria rather than eliminate multiple equilibria, as in
single-period global games.
To isolate the effect of coupling, here we focus on
contagion of regime shifts in a simple setting, the sin-
gular limit in which x(t) and y(t) change arbitrar-
ily more quickly than the “slow parameters” a, b, c, d.
Thus, we focus on the critical manifold, i.e., the solu-
tions (x∗, y∗) to System (1) with dx/dt = dy/dt = 0.
Next we briefly review the familiar result that,
in the absence of coupling, the subsystems evolving
according to Eq. (1a) and Eq. (1b) each have two
saddle-node bifurcations, and then we show how cou-
pling functions C·(·, ·) move those “tipping points”.
3
2.1 Uncoupled systems each undergo
a cusp catastrophe
If the coupling functions C·(·, ·) are identically zero,
then subsystems X and Y are uncoupled, and
Eqs. (1a) and (1b) are the normal forms of the cusp
catastrophe (in the special case of a minus sign on the
cubic term [65, Theorem 8.1]). We chose this form
to study the general effects of couplings rather than
domain-specific versions of the cusp, which are topo-
logically equivalent to the normal form in Eq. (1a).
Hereafter, we take c = d = 1 for simplicity.
If the subsystems evolving according to Eq. (1a)
and Eq. (1b) are uncoupled, then both subsystems
have three equilibria for certain intervals of the slow
parameters a and b, as depicted in Fig. 1. In this
case, the set of fixed points of Eq. (1a) undergoes
two saddle-node bifurcations at values of a that we
denote by abreak and by asustain (the same terminol-
ogy used in [59]). Each subsystem is a classic ex-
ample of hysteresis. For instance, if the equilibrium
x∗ of Eq. (1a) is on the “lower stable branch” [the
blue curve in Fig. 1(b)], then as a increases past the
“breaking point” abreak, the solution x(t) jumps to
the “upper stable branch” depicted by the red curve.
[In other words, the subsystem passes a tipping point
(undergoes a regime shift).] As the parameter a is
slowly decreased, the large equilibrium is sustained
[i.e., x(t) lies on the red curve] until a passes asustain,
at which point the subsystem x(t) jumps to the lower
branch.
2.2 Master–slave with linear coupling
Next we consider the analytically-solvable case of a
master–slave system with linear coupling. Specif-
ically, subsystem X drives subsystem Y (denoted
X ⇀ Y ) according to the coupling function
CY (x, y) := σx, where the constant σ ∈ R is the cou-
pling strength. (For instance, consider unidirectional
investment between sectors in the Kaldor business cy-
cle model, as in [71], or movement of organisms from
one patch of an ecosystem to another, as in [101, 28].)
Then Eq. (1) becomes
dx
dt
= −x3 + x+ a (2a)
dy
dt
= −y3 + y + b+ σx. (2b)
The equilibria of Eq. (2) can be obtained analyti-
cally by first solving for the equilibria x∗ of the mas-
ter subsystem [Eq. (2a)], and then by using the so-
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Figure 1: In isolation, each system has two
saddle-node bifurcations. (a) The flow x˙ in
Eq. (1a) has one or three equilibria, depending on
the value of the parameter a. Filled (respectively,
open) circles denote stable (unstable) equilibria. (b)
The bifurcation diagram [the equilibria x∗ of (1a) as
a function of a] is a slice of the cusp catastrophe, with
two saddle-node bifurcations at values of a denoted
by abreak and by asustain. The solid (respectively,
dashed) curves are stable (unstable) fixed points x∗.
Triple arrows denote the fast flow (1a); single arrows
denote a slow flow da/dt described in the text.
lution(s) to calculate the equilibria y∗ of the slave
subsystem [Eq. (2b)]. The saddle-node bifurcations
of the slave subsystem [Eq. (2b)] now depend on
the equilibrium value(s) x∗ of the master subsys-
tem [Eq. (2a)] and on the coupling strength σ; we
denote the slave subsystem’s bifurcations (with re-
spect to b) by bbreak(σx∗) and by bsustain(σx∗). Be-
cause x∗ has three possible values whenever the mas-
ter parameter a ∈ (asustain, abreak), the slave subsys-
tem has three possible values for each of its bifur-
cation points bbreak(σx∗) and bsustain(σx∗) whenever
a ∈ (asustain, abreak).
Figure 2 shows the resulting bifurcation diagrams
of the slave subsystem for σ = 0.1. The saddle-node
bifurcations are now functions of the coupling term:
b•(σx∗) = b•(0) − σx∗, where • is either “break”
or “sustain”, and b•(0) is the bifurcation when the
subsystems are uncoupled (σ = 0). To understand
the consequences of this displacement of the bifurca-
tions, suppose that the coupling strength σ is pos-
itive and that the master subsystem is initially on
its lower stable branch [the blue curve in Fig. 1(b)].
Thus, x(0) = x∗ < 0 and σx∗ < 0, so the mas-
ter subsystem suppresses a regime shift in the slave
subsystem, meaning that the parameter b must in-
crease further to pass bbreak(σx∗) compared to the
case of no coupling (σ = 0). However, if the master
subsystem passes its break point (i.e., if a increases
4
past abreak), then the master subsystem x(t) jumps
to its upper stable branch [the red curve in Fig. 1(b)],
where x(t) = x∗ > 0. That sudden change facilitates
a regime shift in the slave subsystem, meaning that
the parameter b does not need to increase as much
[in order to pass bbreak(σx∗) = bbreak(0) − σx∗] as it
would if there were no coupling.
This simple system illuminates how regime shifts
might synchronize. When the slow parameter a of
the master subsystem [Eq. (2a)] increases past its
saddle-node bifurcation at abreak, the master subsys-
tem jumps to its upper stable branch of equilibria [re-
call Fig. 1(b)], so the relevant saddle-node bifurcation
for the slave subsystem [Eq. (2b)] suddenly changes
from the blue curve to the red curve in Fig. 2(b).
Thus, at the moment when a passes abreak, if the
value of b lies above the red curve in Fig. 2(b) (and
below the blue curve, meaning that the slave sub-
system has not already jumped to its upper branch
of equilibria), then the regime shift in the slave sub-
system occurs simultaneously with the regime shift
in the master subsystem. The green line segment in
Fig. 2 marks the “synchronizing window” S, the inter-
val of values of (a, b) leading to synchronized regime
shifts.1
For an interpretation of the synchronizing window,
consider two economies X and Y that are both stuck
in recession in the Kaldor business cycle model [59,
71]. If X undergoes a boom, does the rise in the
demand of X for imports from Y push Y out of its
recession? The synchronizing window S specifies how
close to its tipping point Y must be for the economic
booms to synchronize, which provides an answer to
Krugman’s conjecture in [59].
In summary, there are three ways in which the two
subsystems in Eq. (2) could both pass their breaking
points, abreak and bbreak(σx∗). First, the slave subsys-
tem could undergo a regime shift on its own, meaning
that b increases past the blue curve in Fig. 2(b) while
a remains below abreak, and subsequently a passes
abreak. Second, the two subsystems could simultane-
ously pass their breaking points, meaning that (a, b)
crosses the synchronizing window in Fig. 2(b). Third,
the master subsystem could pass its breaking point
abreak, but the slave subsystem remains too far from
1 Specifically, S is the Cartesian product {abreak} × I,
where I = [bbreak(σx∗upper), bbreak(σx∗lower)] ⊂ R is the closed
interval with the minimum (respectively, maximum) of I equal
to the value of bbreak(σx∗) for x∗ on its upper (respectively,
lower) branch of equilibria at a = abreak. The “break-type”
regime shifts synchronize if and only if the slow variables (a, b)
pass through S.
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Figure 2: Coupling a slave subsystem to a
master subsystem moves the slave subsystem’s
tipping points and can change them suddenly.
Panel (a): The bifurcation diagram of the slave sub-
system shows the equilibrium of the slave subsystem
y∗(b;σx∗) as a function of its slow parameter b. (The
slave subsystem’s equilibrium y∗ also depends on the
coupling term σx∗ due to the influence of the master
subsystem.) In this example, the master subsystem
has just passed its break point a > abreak, so the mas-
ter subsystem has quickly moved to its upper stable
branch of equilibria (x∗ > 0). Because the coupling
strength σ > 0, the sudden shift in the master sub-
system makes it easier for the slave subsystem to pass
its break point [bbreak(σx∗) < bbreak(0)]. Panel (b):
The locations of the saddle-node bifurcations of the
slave subsystem [Eq. (2b)], denoted by bbreak(σx∗)
and by bsustain(σx∗), are one- or three-valued func-
tions of a, the parameter of the master subsystem.
The colors match those in Fig. 1: if the master sub-
system’s equilibrium x∗ lies on its lower (respectively,
upper) stable branch depicted in Fig. 1(b), then the
bifurcation points of the slave subsystem are the blue
(respectively, red) curves in panel (b). There exist
three equilibria y∗ in the shaded blue (respectively,
red) regions. Here, σ > 0, so the master subsystem
acts to prevent the slave subsystem from crossing its
break point bbreak(σx∗) when x∗ < 0 and facilitates
it when x∗ > 0. If (a, b) crosses the green line seg-
ment marked “sync. window”, then the regime shifts
synchronize: the master subsystem [Eq. (2a)] crosses
its break point abreak, causing x∗ to jump from a neg-
ative number to a positive number, which causes the
slave subsystem [Eq. (2b)] to cross its break point
bbreak(σx
∗).
its tipping point (despite becoming abruptly closer),
so there is a delay in time between the regime shifts.
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As the subsystems become more strongly coupled
(larger coupling strength σ), it becomes easier for the
regime shifts to synchronize: the S-shaped curves in
Fig. 2(b) stretch vertically (but the intersections of
the dashed curves and the a = 0 axis remain fixed), so
the synchronizing window S enlarges with σ. (For an
illustration, see Fig. SM-1 in the Supplement.) The
results of other simple coupling functions, such as
±σ|x|, are simple transformations of Fig. 2(b) (see
Fig. SM-2); we chose the coupling σx for simplicity.
The results of this subsection also apply to couplings
that form a directed star graph.2 [A glossary of ter-
minology for graphs and networks is provided in Ap-
pendix A.]
If the coupling were bidirectional, then the equilib-
ria (x∗, y∗) would no longer be solvable in closed form.
Although synchronized regime shifts could still occur,
characterizing the equilibria becomes more compli-
cated, as illustrated by Abraham’s numerical stud-
ies [1]. (For more details on related mathematical
literature, see Appendix B.) Next we generalize in a
way such that the equilibria remain analytically solv-
able.
2.3 Master–slave–slave system X ⇀
Y ⇀ Z
Now we introduce a third subsystem Z, and we as-
sume that Y drives Z in the same way in which the
master subsystem X drives Y (and with the same
coupling strength σ, for simplicity). Thus, we aug-
ment Eqs. (2a) and (2b) with the equation
z′ = −z3 + z + c+ σy (3)
with a new slow parameter c ∈ R that, like a and b,
changes much more slowly than x, y and z do.
Regime shifts can spread in two ways in this sys-
tem X ⇀ Y ⇀ Z. First, if all three systems are
sufficiently close to their tipping points, then a cas-
cade of regime shifts can occur, one causing the next.
The second way is more novel: if the intermediate sys-
tem Y is relatively far from its tipping point whereas
X and Z are close to their tipping points, then the
sequence of regime shifts can “hop” over the interme-
diate system Y . That is, a regime shift in the master
subsystem [Eq. (2a)] can nudge the intermediate sys-
tem Y [Eq. (2b)] enough to trigger a regime shift in
2A directed star coupling graph, {X ⇀ Yi : i = 1, 2, . . . , n−
1}, is a system with one master subsystem that evolves accord-
ing to Eq. (2a) and that drives n−1 slave subsystems according
to Eq. (2b), with potentially different parameters for the vari-
ous slave subsystems Yi.
the third system Z [Eq. (3)] but not so much that Y
undergoes a regime shift.
We illustrate these two phenomena in Fig. 3, a
plot of the “downstream subsystem” Z’s break point
cbreak(σy
∗) at the moment when the master sub-
system’s parameter a increases past its break point
abreak. At this moment, the master subsystem jumps
from its lower branch of equilibria to its upper branch,
so we change focus from the red curve to the blue
curve in Fig. 3. If the slow parameters (b, c) lie in the
orange region labeled “cascade” in Fig. 3, then a cas-
cade of regime shifts occurs, one regime shift causing
the next. To see why, note that b lies in its synchro-
nizing window S [the green line in Figs. 2(b) and 3],
so Y passes its break point bbreak(σx∗); and note that
c lies above the thick, red line cbreak(σy∗), so Z passes
its break point cbreak(σy∗). If, on the other hand, the
parameters (b, c) lie in the yellow region labeled “hop”
in Fig. 3, then the sequence of regime shifts hops over
the intermediate subsystem Y . To see why, note that
b is below its synchronizing window S, so b does not
pass its break point bbreak(σx∗) when a crosses abreak,
but notice that c lies above the red thin line, so Z
passes its break point cbreak(σy∗) despite receiving
only a small nudge from Y .
Note that such “cascade hopping” cannot occur in
many classic models of cascades, including the Ising
model [30], sandpile models [30], and threshold mod-
els [103, 11]. For cascade hopping to occur, some
vertices of the graph must be able to affect their
neighbors in at least three ways (e.g., with a small,
medium, or large amount of force). A phenomenon
that is qualitatively similar to cascade hopping oc-
curs in epidemiology: some diseases are contagious
yet asymptomatic, so the sequence of contractions
of the disease can appear to hop over individuals.
Different people remain in the asymptomatic state
for different amounts of time, which resembles cou-
pled subsystems with different proximities to tipping
points.3 Next we show circumstantial evidence that
cascade hopping may occur in other kinds of conta-
gion in human populations.
3 Communication-coupled out-
breaks of protest
We have presented a “model of many models” that
3HIV is an example of an infection with large variability in
asymptomatic periods, resulting mostly from variability among
patients [77].
6
��� �-��� � ��� �-��� � �
������(σ�*)
���
�������
�������������� �⇀�
�������������� �⇀�
�* �� ��� ������ ����� �������* �� ��� ����� ������ ����� ������
Figure 3: Catastrophes can cascade, or they
can hop over intermediate systems. The two
backward-S-shaped curves are plots of the break
point cbreak(σy∗) of the downstream system Z
[Eq. (3)] as a function of the slow parameter b of
the intermediate system (2b) for coupling strength
σ = 0.2. The two curves show the effect of the master
parameter a increasing past its break point abreak, at
which time we change focus from the blue, right-hand
curve to the red, left-hand curve. Thick curves (re-
spectively, thin curves, dashed curves) correspond to
the intermediate system y∗ on its upper stable branch
(respectively, lower stable branch, middle unstable
branch). As in Fig. 2(b), the green line marks the
synchronizing window S for X and Y [the values of
b such that, when a crosses abreak, the intermediate
system Y passes its break point bbreak(σx∗)]. The
cyan line marks the analogous interval for Y and Z
(for a = abreak). The orange and yellow regions are
values of (b, c) leading to sequences of regime shifts
that cascade or that jump over Y , respectively.
captures a commonality among systems in Table 1
but that ignores many domain-specific details. If the
models in Table 1 are one step removed from reality,
then the stylized model in Sec. 2 is two steps removed
from reality. The virtue of studying such a simple
model is to elucidate what phenomena might happen
in more realistic settings.
To give one example, in this section we consider
protests and revolutions occurring in many coun-
tries. In Sec. 3.1, we summarize Kuran’s model of
protests and revolutions based on preference falsifi-
cation [62] and Slee’s model of identity-driven cas-
cades [93]. Our model is a stylized generalization
of these models to multiple countries, with finance
and cross-border identity being two possible mecha-
nisms for coupling protests across borders. Next, we
study data on countries involved in the Arab Spring,
the uprisings in Northern Africa and in the Middle
East during 2010–2011. Using the theoretical model
of Sec. 2 as a guide for asking questions, we explore
the role of contagion and common cause in the Arab
Spring (Sec. 3.2), whether protests seem to spread
locally (Sec. 3.3) or in non-local jumps (Sec. 3.4).
3.1 Models of revolutions based on
preference falsification and iden-
tity
To begin, we summarize two models of protests and
revolutions that emerge suddenly via saddle-node bi-
furcations. Then we explain how the conceptual
framework in Sec. 2 can capture a generalization of
these models to multiple countries with couplings
between them. (Not all models of protests have
saddle-node bifurcations. For some recent examples,
see [16, 67, 68, 12].)
One way in which protests and revolutions can
emerge suddenly is because people had been pub-
licly declaring a preference different from their pri-
vate preference [62]. This idea, called preference fal-
sification, has been used in several applications [64].
In Kuran’s model of revolutions [62], the unit interval
[0, 1] denotes a political spectrum, with 0 representing
the current government and 1 representing the oppo-
sition. He assumes that people derive “reputational
utility” from publicly declaring a certain preference in
[0, 1], plus an “integrity utility” from declaring a pref-
erence close to their private preference. Slow changes
in these utility functions or in the distribution of pref-
erences can cause a large, sudden change in collective
sentiment (in a saddle-node bifurcation).
Kuran’s model is more rich than the model in
Sec. 2, as it has utility functions, distributions of
preferences, and weights of different people, but the
manifold of equilibria in Kuran’s model is equivalent
(in a catastrophe theoretic sense [95]) to that of the
isolated subsystem in Eq. (2a). The state variable in
Kuran’s model is the (weighted) share of people who
publicly declare that they prefer the opposition. The
equilibrium [62, Eq. 8] has one or three equilibria; in
the latter case, two equilibria are stable and the other
unstable, as illustrated in [62, Figures 3–7]. The dif-
ference between the thick and thin curves in Figures
3–7 of [62] is the analog of Figure 1(a).
Kuran explains two ways in which a saddle-node
bifurcation can occur, leaving only one equilibrium
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corresponding to a large public support of the oppo-
sition [62, Section 4.1, pages 51–53]:
1. a shift in the distribution of private preferences
toward the opposition [62, Fig. 3] due to, for
example, an economic downturn [44];
2. a change in the reputational utility terms (for
example, because the opposition becomes better
able to give reputational utility), causing a shift
in the threshold function that marks whether
someone supports the opposition or the govern-
ment.
These two shifts correspond to changes in a “slow vari-
able” [such as the variable a in Equation (2a)].
To suggest that our model might capture a gen-
eralization of Kuran’s model to multiple countries,
we must motivate the assumption that the state vari-
ables in different countries are coupled somehow. Ku-
ran mentions one possible mechanism: a shift in the
reputational utility (item 2 in the list above) could
be “made possible by funds provided by a foreign
source” [62, page 53]. That is, a coupling to a for-
eign country (here, a financial type), could change
the equations of motion such that two equilibria van-
ish, leaving only the equilibrium that corresponds to
large support for the opposition. To continue Kuran’s
story, suppose that those foreign funds were sent from
the opposition in a country that has just undergone
massive protests, say, because that country passed a
saddle-node bifurcation. This example corresponds
to the master subsystem crossing its break point (a
passes abreak), and the coupling σx qualitatively cap-
tures the increase in the ability of the opposition in
the second country to give reputational utility to sup-
porters because of financial funds from abroad.
Identity provides another possible coupling across
borders. Gause [38] argues that pan-Arab identity is
an important reason why the Arab Spring protests
emerged nearly simultaneously and why it took Mid-
dle East specialists by surprise. Identity that spans
borders could couple decisions to protest. For exam-
ple, in Slee’s model of revolutions based on rational-
choice theories of identity [93], people suffer disutility
due to cognitive dissonance whenever their actions
differ from the norms associated with their identity.
Slee considers two identities associated with the gov-
ernment and with the opposition. Like in Kuran’s
model [62], small changes can eliminate two equilib-
ria, causing large protests to erupt. To continue Slee’s
reasoning [93], if people protest in one country, then it
becomes more important for others in a nearby coun-
try to act according to their anti-government identity.
If x(t) measures the share of people in one country
who are protesting, then the importance of identity
in the utility functions of people in a different coun-
try could vary directly with x(t), such as the simple
linear coupling CY (y, x) = σx(t) studied in Sec. 2.2
and Sec. 2.3.
These social-scientific models of revolutions based
on preference falsification and identity illustrate how
difficult it is to validate our coupled-threshold model
with real data: these models are based on cognitive
dissonance, preferences, and identity. In principle,
these cognitive phenomena could be studied with sur-
veys, ethnographies, and other labor-intensive meth-
ods. These theories [62, 93], which are grounded in
social scientific understand of human behavior, can be
seen as the connection between our conceptual model
and real systems. When we describe our model as a
“model of models” and hence two steps removed from
reality, we have in mind models like [62, 93] that have
bistability.
Multiple equilibria can also arise if people have
greater incentives to protest as more people decide
to protest (i.e., strategic complementarities) [43], for
example because of safety in numbers [63, page 18].
Multiple equilibria also occur in repeated coordina-
tion games in which people learn about the number of
protestors needed to overthrow the regime (so-called
dynamic global games) [4].
Now that we have connected the stylized model
in Sec. 2 and sociological literature such as [62, 93],
we next investigate data from the Arab Spring with
questions generated from the conceptual framework
of Sec. 2.
3.2 Contagion versus common cause
in the Arab Spring
Why did many protests begin nearly simultaneously
in the Arab Spring? One explanation is common
cause (called the monsoonal effect in the context of
contagious currency crises [73]): an external driver,
such as rising global food prices, pushes all coun-
tries past their tipping points (as suggested in [66]).
Another explanation is contagion: couplings among
countries (such as communication) helped to synchro-
nize their protests. The analog of common cause in
System (1) in Sec. 2 is that the slow parameters a
and b both increase and pass their tipping points si-
multaneously (or at nearly the same time), with or
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even without coupling. The analog of contagion is
that the slow parameter a increases past its tipping
point, which (via the coupling) pushes b past its tip-
ping point.
To begin to explore the possible roles of com-
mon cause and contagion, we study data on at-
tributes of countries [100, 35, 52] and data on com-
munication between countries via Facebook and tele-
phone. Communication across borders spread inspi-
ration to protest, freedom memes, and strategies for
success [49, 52, 56]. Therefore, cross-border com-
munication via Facebook and telephone may have
spurred people to publicly declare their private pref-
erences [62] or to act according to norms of their
government-opposing identities [93]. The Facebook
data available [81] is coarse-grained: for each country,
we have the ranked list of the top five other countries
to which members of the focal country have the most
friends (in 2012, the only year available to us).
Figure 4 shows the subgraph of this Facebook
graph induced by countries that protested in the
Arab Spring, together with two countries that did
not protest but that may have communicated influ-
ence to protest and that shared Arab identity, Qatar
and the United Arab Emirates.4 Next, to explore
the possible roles of common cause and contagion,
we study what attributes of countries correlate with
when their protests began. We found that unemploy-
ment most significantly correlates with protest start
date (see the downward trend in Fig. 4). That sug-
gests that high-unemployment countries were closer
to their tipping points.5
Internet penetration, the fraction of the popula-
tion that uses the Internet [100], which is plotted as
vertex diameter in Fig. 4, may indicate the strength
of coupling to other countries via social media such
as Facebook, which was thought to be an important
channel for inspiring protests [49, 48]. However, In-
ternet penetration is a weak and statistically insignif-
icant predictor of when protests started in various
countries.6
Spikes in commodity food prices have been pro-
posed as a significant cause of the Arab Spring [66].
4Expatriates in other countries may be important, too, but
we add only Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to our anal-
ysis given their geographic and cultural proximity to the coun-
tries with protests.
5Linear regression indicates that each additional 1% in
unemployment in 2010 is associated with protests starting
3.2 ± 1.6 days earlier (mean ± 1 standard error); the p-value
is 0.06 and R2 is 0.25, suggesting statistical significance.
6Each percentage of Internet users delays the protest start
date by 0.44± 0.37 days; p-value 0.25, R2 = 0.099
Here we consider consumer food prices [35], which did
not noticeably spike in 2010 [25]; we found that these
indices in 2010 were not predictive of when protests
began in different countries.7
Many other covariates, from economic indicators
to political freedoms, were similarly weak and statis-
tically insignificant predictors of when protests be-
gan (for the list of covariates, see the first column of
Figs. SM-4 and SM-5). Furthermore, using the cri-
terion for forward selection, we could not reject the
null hypothesis that any of these covariates could be
considered together with unemployment.
Because this network data is longitudinal, hazards
models [107] or generalized estimating equations [24]
could be useful. A challenge, however, is the small
sample size (about a dozen countries).
3.3 Did Arab Spring protests spread
locally?
The “domino hypothesis”—that the Arab Spring
protests spread locally like falling dominoes—has
been the subject of speculation [13, 52, 33] but, to our
knowledge, little analysis. An alternative hypothesis,
motivated by the “hopping” phenomenon in Sec. 2.3,
is that Arab Spring protests spread non-locally in
some way.
We find circumstantial evidence in support of both
hypotheses. In support of the domino hypothesis,
we found that, among countries that had protests, a
majority of those countries share a border8 with at
least one country whose protests began earlier, and
a majority have a Facebook link from at least one
country whose protest began earlier. These results
are statistically significant compared to a null model
of randomized protest dates.9 In addition to this evi-
7The index [35] is expressed on a scale such that it equals
100 in the year 2000. Each unit increase in the consumer food
price index is associated with protests occurring 0.09 ± 0.26
days earlier, but with p-value 0.74 and R2 = 0.011.
8We assume that Bahrain borders Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and
the U.A.E. given the proximity and the fact that Saudi Ara-
bia and the U.A.E. sent troops to Bahrain to quell protests
there [17], suggesting that protests Bahrain would likely spread
to Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E.
9 Specifically, 7 of the 16 countries with protests in Fig. 4
and 11 of all 20 countries with protests (listed in Table 3)
shared a border with at least one country with protests; com-
paring this outcome to randomized protest start times gives a
p-value of 0.02 in both cases. For the Facebook graph, 10 out
of the 16 countries with protests in Fig. 4 and 14 out of all
20 countries with protests (listed in Table 3) had at least one
incoming Facebook link to a country with protests that started
earlier (p-values 0.06, 0.16, respectively).
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Figure 4: Exploration of the roles of proximities to tipping points and coupling (cross-border
communication) for countries involved in the Arab Spring. Shown is the unemployment in 2010 [100]
versus the date at which protests began [104] (see Table 3 in the Supplement) for 16 countries that had
protests, plus Qatar and the U.A.E. The best-fit line has slope −0.5% per week (p-value 0.06, R2 = 0.25;
U.A.E. and Qatar ignored). The direction of the Facebook edges [81] captures the spread of influence to
protest: an edge from i to j means that i is among j’s five countries with which j has the most Facebook
friends (in the year 2012); edge thickness decreases linearly with rank, so the thickest edges correspond to
rank one (the strongest coupling). Vertex color denotes out-degree; high out-degree nodes (e.g., Egypt and
Saudi Arabia) may be particularly influential in spreading influence to protest via Facebook. Highlighted in
red edges with large arrowheads is one cascade hop motif, Egypt→ Saudi Arabia→ Bahrain (see Definition 1
for the definition and Table 2 for the other nine hop motifs). A version of this plot with a few more countries
that protested much later than the dates shown here is in Fig. SM-3 in the Supplement.
dence of local spread, we also find evidence of protests
spreading non-locally, discussed next.
3.4 Cascade hopping in the Arab
Spring
Here we show circumstantial evidence that protests
may have spread in a non-local way consistent with
the “cascade hopping” phenomenon in Sec. 2.3. An
empirical signature of the “hopping” phenomenon—
though not conclusive evidence of it—is a small sub-
graph in which protests appear to hop over a coun-
try. If this small subgraph appears more often com-
pared to a reasonable null model, then this subgraph
is called a “motif”. We call this particular motif a “hop
motif” and define it as follows. (For definitions of net-
work terminology, see the Glossary in Appendix A.)
Definition 1 A hop motif in a directed coupling
graph is a triple of countries (X,Y, Z) such that
1. the subgraph induced by {X,Y, Z} is the directed
path X ⇀ Y ⇀ Z;10
2. there is no coupling edge pointing to Z from any
country that began to protest before Z did;
3. protests began first in X, then in Z, and then in
Y (or Y did not have any protests).
10For the Facebook graph [81], this path subgraph means
that X is on Y ’s top-5 list (of countries to which people in Y
have the most friends) and that Y is on Z’s top-5 list.
10
For the Facebook network shown in Fig. 4, ten
triples of countries, listed in Table 2, satisfy these
criteria in Definition 1. One of them, Egypt→ Saudi
Arabia → Bahrain, is highlighted with red edges and
large arrowheads in Fig. 4. Compared to a null model
with random protest start times, the network in Fig. 4
has more hop motifs than 93.3% of randomized ver-
sions.
These hop motifs suggest (but do not conclusively
show) that Saudi Arabia and Egypt played the role of
an intermediate subsystem Y in Sec. 2.3. Specifically,
the motifs suggest that Saudi Arabia and Egypt may
have received influence from protesting countries that
played the role of the upstream subsystem X (e.g.,
Tunisia, Jordan) and propagated influence to other
countries that played the role of the downstream sub-
system Z (e.g., Bahrain, Oman), which may have
helped to trigger protests in Z before protests be-
gan in Y . Consistent with relative deprivation the-
ory (which argues that economic stress puts coun-
tries close to a tipping point) [44], we find that the
upstream and downstream countries in Table 2 were
relatively closer to tipping points than intermediate
countries (see Sec. SM-4 of the SM).
Unlike work on temporal motifs in telephone call
data [57, 58], here events occur on the nodes rather
than on the edges (i.e., protests occur in coun-
tries, whereas phone calls occur between individuals).
Thus, hop motifs were not studied in work on tem-
poral motifs [57, 58].
Note that a hop motif (X,Y, Z) is delicate: a
communication link from X to Z could explain why
protests began in Z before they began in Y . None
of the upstream and downstream countries X and
Z share a border, and only Jordan and Oman had
a significant amount of cross-border telephone calls
in 2010 (8.3 × 106 minutes), which eliminates two
of the ten hop motifs in the Facebook network (Ta-
ble 2). Data on other communication between coun-
tries, such as cross-border mentions of hashtags on
Twitter [49] and consumption of news media, could
reveal communication from X to Z, but obtaining
such data is difficult and beyond the scope of this pa-
per. A limitation of the Facebook dataset is that we
only know the top-5 countries to which each country
has the most Facebook friends; considering only the
top-R lists with R ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} did not result in any
new hop motifs.
Table 2: Ten “hop motifs” in the Facebook data (see
Definition 1). The notation “X r−→ Y ” means that
country X is located at position r on the list of coun-
tries ranked in descending order by the number of
Facebook friends with people in country Y . For ex-
ample, “Egypt 1−→ Saudi Arabia” means that Saudis
have more Facebook friends in Egypt than in any
other country.
upstream X r−→ intermed. Y r−→ downstream Z
Egypt 1−→ Saudi Arabia 1−→ Bahrain
Yemen 2−→ Saudi Arabia 1−→ Bahrain
Tunisia 3−→ Egypt 1−→ Jordan
Jordan 2−→ Egypt 4−→ Oman
Tunisia 3−→ Egypt 4−→ Oman
Egypt 3−→ Kuwait 4−→ Bahrain
Jordan 4−→ Saudi Arabia 1−→ Bahrain
Jordan 4−→ Saudi Arabia 2−→ Oman
Sudan 5−→ Saudi Arabia 1−→ Bahrain
Egypt 5−→ U.A.E. 2−→ Bahrain
4 Discussion
Some of the most pressing global challenges involve
the prediction and control of sudden changes propa-
gating among coupled subsystems, such as avoiding
disastrous shifts in the biosphere [9] and preventing
crises in the financial system [76]. Livelihoods could
also improve if sudden adoption of technologies in
coupled markets were facilitated [59, 23], or if coupled
recessions and booms in economies were better man-
aged [59, 15, 83, 53, 20], or if social uprisings spread-
ing among countries were better forecast [38, 49, 52].
Mathematically understanding tipping points in cou-
pled subsystems is a step toward meeting these chal-
lenges.
In this paper, we have shown in a conceptual model
how regime shifts can propagate among coupled sub-
systems by cascading or even by jumping over sub-
systems. Here, we model a regime shift as a param-
eter passing a saddle-node bifurcation, which causes
a sudden change to a different equilibrium. Such be-
havior appears in many systems [90, 91] but is not the
only kind of regime shift [14, 50]. This model com-
bines continuous and discrete, threshold-like changes.
The study of models with these features is a challenge
in several disciplines, such as in failures spreading in
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economic input–output models [8] or in electric power
grids (though in a more non-local way) [46, 34]. We
also find non-local spread: the next subsystem to pass
a tipping point may lie two or more “hops” away from
those that have passed their tipping points.
This model captures just one aspect of many mod-
els (couplings and saddle-node bifurcations), but it
ignores many domain-specific details that could also
be quite important. At best, this “model of many
models” can suggest what phenomena might occur in
more complicated, domain specific models or in real
data. As an example, we find ten “hop motifs” (i.e.,
sequences of sudden changes that appear to hop over
intermediate subsystems) in data on communication
among countries involved in the Arab Spring protests.
Much attention is devoted to regime shifts in large,
central nodes, such as the effect of recessions in large
economies or the question of whether to bail out large
banks. Our findings suggest that small, seemingly in-
nocuous changes in these central nodes (perhaps trig-
gered by a large change in a small node adjacent to
it) can suffice to trigger a regime shift in a periph-
eral node close to its tipping point. Such dynamics
may have occurred in the aftermath of the 2008 finan-
cial crisis given that in the United States hundreds
of small banks failed but few large banks failed [29].
Peripheral players in networks may be vulnerable to
sequences of regime shifts that hop over the core, an
issue that seems to merit further attention.
An open challenge is to estimate tipping points
(if they exist at all) in various complex systems, us-
ing data from historical examples. Considering data
not only from the Arab Spring but also from other
episodes of nearly synchronous uprisings (e.g., in So-
viet countries in 1989 [63, 70, 55] and others [80])
could elucidate how couplings among countries affect
their proximities to tipping points. This understand-
ing could enable better prediction of the next protest
or revolt, complementing new techniques for mining
news for sentiment and tone [69, 7] and early warning
signals applied to social network activity [61]. Simi-
lar advances have been made in understanding con-
tagion of currency and debt crises among countries in
the 1990s [73].
Another challenge is to extend work on temporal
motifs in telephone call data [57, 58] to settings like
the one considered here. In the systems summarized
in Table 1 and in the model in Sec. 2, events oc-
cur on the nodes (rather than on the edges [57, 58]),
and nodes can be influenced by multiple ongoing
events (rather than participating in just one event
at a time [57, 58]). Hop motifs are just one example
in this new class of temporal motifs.
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Data accessibility
The following data used in this article are freely avail-
able online:
• Unemployment in 2010, unemployment of young
men (age 15–24) in 2010, GDP per capita in
2010 (based on purchasing power parity in con-
stant 2011 US dollars), and Internet penetration
in 2010 are from The World Bank [100].
• GDP per capita for Djbouti, Libya, Syria,
and Somalia were missing in the World Bank
data [100]. To fill these gaps, we used
the GDP per capita (for the year 2011) in
the Wolfram|Alpha knowledgebase (http://
www.wolframalpha.com/).
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• Missing data on Internet penetration in 2010 for
Somalia in the World Bank data [100] was filled
using data from [54] by linearly interpolating be-
tween the Internet use in 2009 (1.16%) and 2011
(1.25%), arriving at the estimate of 1.2%.
• The Gini coefficient of the wealth distribution,
level of oil production (Fig. SM-4), fraction of
the population living in urban areas (Fig. SM-5),
fraction of the population under age 25 (Fig. SM-
5), and success of the protest in achieving its
goals with minimal violence (Fig. SM-5), are
from Ref. [52, Table 1].
• Political freedom data (the fourth and fifth rows
of Fig. SM-5) are from Freedom House [36].
• Freedom of the press data (the last row of
Fig. SM-5) is from [88].
• The Facebook data [81] was scraped from a Face-
book blog post.
• The cross-border telephone data [99] is from
2010. For each country, the data has the top
10 to 20 countries with the most outgoing tele-
phone calls from the focal country, measured in
millions of minutes. We only have data for pairs
with at least a million minutes. This data was
purchased from TeleGeography, and it is avail-
able at http://spins.ucdavis.edu/.
• Table 3 gives the dates at which protests, demon-
strations or conflicts began in the twenty coun-
tries that had some form of demonstration or
conflict during the Arab Spring (from [104]).
These dates are the horizontal positions of coun-
tries in Fig. 4 in the main text and in Fig. SM-3.
• Shared borders were computed using the func-
tion CountryData in the Wolfram Lan-
guage [105].
A Glossary of network terms
• A network (or graph) is a collection of nodes
(or vertices) and a list of connections (or edges)
among them. For example, in a social network,
the nodes are people and the connections could
be friendships. If those connections have a direc-
tion, then the graph is called directed ; otherwise
the graph is called undirected. Graphs are typi-
cally visualized by drawing the nodes as circles
Table 3: Dates when protests, demonstrations, or
conflicts began in the Arab Spring.
country date protests began
Tunisia December 18, 2010
Algeria December 29, 2010
Jordan January 14, 2011
Oman January 17, 2011
Egypt January 25, 2011
Yemen January 27, 2011
Djibouti January 28, 2011
Somalia January 28, 2011
Sudan January 30, 2011
Bahrain February 14, 2011
Libya February 17, 2011
Kuwait February 19, 2011
Morocco February 20, 2011
Mauritania February 25, 2011
Lebanon February 27, 2011
Syria March 11, 2011
Saudi Arabia March 15, 2011
Israel May 15, 2011
Palestinian Territory September 04, 2012
Iraq December 23, 2012
and the edges among them as lines; if the edges
are directed, then the lines have arrowheads to
indicate their direction.
• A node’s degree is the number of connections it
has. A node in a directed graph has an in-degree
and an out-degree, which are the numbers of in-
coming and outgoing connections, respectively.
• A subgraph of a graph is a graph that is entirely
contained in the original graph. A subgraph in-
duced by a certain subset of nodes is the sub-
graph consisting of all the edges among those
nodes.
• A motif of a graph is a small subgraph that ap-
pears rather frequently compared to some ran-
domized version of the graph.
B Literature related to Sys-
tem (1)
The case of System (1) with bidirectional, symmetric
coupling CX(y, x) = σy, CY (x, y) = σx is a special
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case of the double cusp catastrophe, which is given
by the potential
F = −x4 − y4 + a22x2y2 + a12xy2 + a21x2y
+ cx2 + dy2 + σxy + ax+ by.
This singularity has very rich structure [40, 106, 21].
R. Abraham et al. [1] numerically studied a sys-
tem similar to the double catastrophe, namely x′ =
−x3+ b¯x+ a¯y, y′ = −y3+ d¯y+ c¯x, which is System (1)
but with no constant terms (i.e., a = b = 0) and with
coupling functions CX(y, x) = a¯y, CY (x, y) = c¯x pro-
viding the only terms independent of x and indepen-
dent of y, respectively. They numerically study the
bifurcation sets by plotting the number of equilibria
as a function of the four parameters (a¯, b¯, c¯, d¯). R.
Abraham [2] also outlined how one might study this
system with n equations coupled via some graph; our
paper can be seen as an implementation of this idea.
The widely studied van der Pol oscillator u¨−µ(1−
u2)u˙ + u = 0, upon a Liénard transformation v =
u− u3/3− u˙/µ, becomes
u˙ = µ(−x3/3 + x− v) (4a)
v˙ = u/µ. (4b)
Note that Eq. (4a) has the same form as Eq. (1a)
in the uncoupled case [C·(·, ·) ≡ 0]. Equation (4b) is
a differential equation for the parameter that plays
the role of a in Eq. (1a). The van der Pol oscilla-
tor has a unique, stable limit cycle around the ori-
gin [97]. Many papers have studied coupled van der
Pol oscillators, with a focus on stability of oscilla-
tions [97, 96, 86, 98] and on chaos [84, 85], many
inspired by biological applications [86, 97, 22, 72]. A
related limit-cycle oscillator is the Fitzhugh–Nagumo
model, a two-dimensional ODE that, when coupled
to another such system, can produce chaos [94, Sec.
6.3.3]. Here, we focus on the contagion of regime
shifts in the singular limit, which corresponds to the
limit µ→∞ in Eq. (4b).
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Supplementary Material
SM-1 Stronger coupling makes
it easier to see synchro-
nized regime shifts
If the coupling strength σ is increased, then, as
Fig. SM-1 illustrates, the S-shaped curves in Fig. 2(b)
are stretched vertically, which increases the length of
the synchronizing window. In fact, one can calculate
the synchronizing window S for System (2); the result
is
S =
[
2 (1− 3σ)
3
√
3
,
2 (1 + 3σ)
3
√
3
]
,
which is illustrated in Fig. SM-1(c). The implication
of this expression is that strengthening the coupling
makes synchronized regime shifts more likely, in the
sense that more paths in parameter space lead to syn-
chronized regime shifts.
SM-2 Other simple couplings
The results for coupling functions CY (x, y) = σx and
CX(y, x) = 0 with σ < 0 can be obtained by reflect-
ing the S-shaped curves bbreak(σx∗) and bsustain(σx∗)
about the lines b = bbreak(0) and b = bsustain(0), re-
spectively. In this case, the master subsystem facil-
itates (respectively, impedes) the slave subsystem’s
sudden shift to its upper branch of equilibria when x∗
is on its lower (respectively, upper) branch of equilib-
ria. The effects of coupling functions CY (x, y) = σ|x|
can be obtained similarly. They are illustrated in
Figure SM-2.
SM-3 Facebook subgraph in-
duced by all countries
with protests
In Fig. 4, we excluded Djibouti because it does not
have unemployment data, and we excluded Israel,
Palestinian Territory, and Iraq because their protests
began much later (May 2011, September 2012, and
December 2012, respectively). We also excluded
Mauritania because its unemployment was so large
(31.1%) that including it in Fig. 4 would obscure the
rest of the data.
Figure SM-3 replicates Fig. 4 with these countries
excluded in Fig. 4. Note that Djbouti and Maurita-
nia have very small Internet penetration (6.5% and
4%, respectively), and they participate little in the
Facebook subgraph shown in Fig. SM-3 (Djibouti has
in-degree 2 and out-degree 1, while Mauritania has
in-degree 3 and out-degree 0). Thus, we do not ex-
pect that excluding them from Fig. 4 has significant
effects on the results in Sec. 3.2.
SM-4 Properties of countries in
the hop motifs
Figures SM-4 and SM-5 show properties of the coun-
tries in these different roles X,Y, Z in the hop motifs.
The “upstream” countries X appear to be relatively
close to their tipping points because of their rela-
tively high unemployment, high economic inequality,
low GDP per capita, and large youth bulges. Recall
that intermediate countries Y may have spread in-
fluence to protest from these upstream countries X
to “downstream” countries Z. Country Z began to
protest before Y did, perhaps because Z was closer
to its tipping point [e.g., downstream countries Z had
significantly higher unemployment and greater eco-
nomic inequality (Gini coefficient)] and because in-
termediate countries tend to have relatively strong
economies and significant revenue from oil, indicat-
ing a large distance from a tipping point. Inter-
mediate and downstream countries had significantly
higher Internet and mobile phone penetration, indi-
cating their greater susceptibility to influence from
ongoing protests.
Political rights and civil liberties [36] are too
coarse-grained to distinguish among these coun-
tries. However, some more specific measures, such
as personal autonomy and individual rights, show
greater variance among countries involved in the
Arab Spring; the fifth row of Fig. SM-5 shows that
intermediate countries Y (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
Egypt; data for U.A.E. is missing) tend to have
greater personal autonomy and individual rights,
which may play a role in delaying their protests.
However, even when these populations were not yet
protesting, these citizens may nevertheless have been
communicating inspiration to protest to other coun-
tries. Consistent with this interpretation, these in-
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Figure SM-1: Stronger coupling facilitates synchronization of regime shifts. When a in-
creases past abreak, a regime shift occurs simultaneously in the master–slave system (2) if and only
if b [which is the slow parameter of the slave subsystem, Eq. (2b)] lies in the synchronizing window
S =
[
2
3
√
3
(1− 3σ) , 2
3
√
3
(1 + 3σ)
]
, depicted as a green line in panels (a) and (b) and as a green region
in panel (c). Panels (a) and (b) show how the S-shaped curves bbreak(σx∗) [i.e., the “break point” saddle-
node bifurcation of the slave subsystem, Eq. (2b)] stretch vertically as the coupling strength σ is increased
[σ = 0.1 in panel (a) and σ = 0.2 in panel (b)], thereby enlarging the synchronizing window. Panel (c) shows
the synchronizing window S as a function of the coupling strength σ. If b is below (respectively, above) S
when a = abreak, then the regime shift first occurs in the master (respectively, slave) subsystem, and there
is a delay between regime shifts. The dashed line marks the value of bbreak(σx∗) for the case in which the
subsystems are uncoupled (σ = 0), namely, 2/(3
√
3).
termediate countries also had greater freedom of the
press (bottom row of Fig. SM-5).
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Figure SM-2: Effect of other couplings on the slave subsystem’s bifurcation diagram. As in
Fig. 2(b), if the master subsystem’s equilibrium x∗ lies on its lower (respectively, upper) stable branch
depicted in Fig. 1(b), then the saddle-node bifurcations of the slave subsystem, bbreak(σx∗) and bsustain(σx∗),
are the blue (respectively, red) curves; the dashed curves correspond to the master subsystem being on
its middle, unstable branch of equilibria. If there were no coupling, i.e., if σ were equal to 0, then the
saddle-node bifurcations bbreak(σx∗) and bsustain(σx∗) would be given by the intersections of the black-
dashed curves and the a = 0 axis; comparing the blue and red curves with these intersections determines
whether the master subsystem facilitates or inhibits a regime shift in the slave subsystem. Panel (a): The
coupling CY (x, y) = σx with σ = −0.1 makes it more difficult for the slave subsystem to cross its break
point bbreak(σx∗) when the master subsystem has crossed its break point (x∗ > 0), and vice versa. Panel
(b): The coupling CY (x, y) = σ|x| with σ = 0.1 makes it easier for the slave subsystem to cross its break
point bbreak(|σx∗|) no matter the sign of x. However, once the slave subsystem has crossed its break point,
the value of b must be reduced considerably more in order to cross the “sustain” saddle-node bifurcation,
bsustain(|σx∗|), because of the coupling σ|x| with σ > 0. Flipping the sign of σ, as shown in panel (c), reverses
these effects.
23
�������
�������
��������
�����
����
������
������
������
������������
����������
�������
����
����������� ���������
�����
����� ������
�������
�����
�����
�������
������
�����
��%
��%
���
���
�
���
���
�
���
���
�
���
���
�
���
���
�
���
���
� ���������
���
���
�
���
���
�
���
���
�
���
���
�
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
���� �� ������� ��������
���
��
���
���
���
���
�(%)
������ ������� ∝�������� ����������� ���-�������
�
�
��
��
Figure SM-3: Facebook graph with countries excluded from Fig. 4 (namely, Djibouti, Israel, Palestinian
Territory, Iraq, and Mauritania). The 2010 unemployment rate for Djibouti (30%) was estimated from a
linear regression between the available World Bank data [100] and the “fuzzy” data in Table 1 of [52] (in
which they estimate missing data by comparison with similar countries).
24
��� ������ ������
�
�
�
�
��
��
������������ (%)
����� ������ ������������ �����
�
��
��
��������
������ ����� ������ ��� ������
�
��
��
������������
������� ���� �������
�
��
��
����������
��� ������ ������
����
�����
�����
�����
��� ��� ������ (�)
����� ������ ����� ������ �����
�����
�����
�����
�����
��������
������ ����� ������ ��� ������
�����
�����
�����
����� ������������
������� ���� �������
�����
�����
�����
����� ����������
��� ������ ������
��
��
��
��
��
��
���� �� ������ ������������
����� ������ ������������ �����
��
��
��
��
���
��������
������ ����� ������ ��� ������
��
��
��
��
��� ������������
������� ���� �������
��
��
��
��
��� ����������
��� ������ ������
��
���
���
��� �������� ���� ����� �����
����� ������ ������������ �����
��
���
���
���
��������
������ ����� ������ ��� ������
��
���
���
���
������������
������� ���� �������
��
���
���
���
����������
��� ������ ������
����
����
����
��
���� (��� ���������� � ���������)
����� ������ ������������ �����
��
��
��
��
��������
������ ����� ������ ��� ������
��
��
��
��
������������
������� ���� �������
��
��
��
��
����������
��� ������ ������
��
��
��
��
�� �������� ����������� (%)
����� ������ ������������ �����
����
����
����
��������
������ ����� ������ ��� ������
����
����
����
������������
������� ���� �������
����
����
����
����������
Figure SM-4: Economic properties of countries in the ten hop motifs (Table 2). Each row is one
attribute of a country (unemployment, etc.) The left-hand column are weighted averages of the countries in
the different roles X,Y, Z (labeled upstream, intermediate, downstream) in the hop motif (see Definition 1).
The right-hand three columns show the countries in each of those roles; in each of these plots, the thick,
horizontal line shows the mean, while the thin lines show the mean ±1 standard error. All data are from
2010.
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Figure SM-5: Social and political properties of countries in the ten hop motifs (Table 2). As in
Fig. SM-4, the left-hand column shows weighted averages for the countries in the three roles X,Y, Z in the
hop motifs (as defined in Definition 1), while the other columns show the countries (and their properties) in
those weighted averages. All the data are from 2010 except for press freedom (2013).
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